Section 24 Indian Evidence Act

Veera Ibrahim vs. The State of Maharashtra (18.03.2026 - SC) : MANU/SC/0514/1976

12. The next question to be considered is, whether this statement was hit by Section 24 of the Evidence Act. The contention is that this statement was obtained under compulsion of law inasmuch as he was required to state the truth under threat of prosecution for perjury.

13. For reasons that follow, we are unable to sustain this contention.

14. To attract the prohibition enacted in Section 24, Evidence Act, these facts must be established:

(i) that the statement in question is a confession;

(ii) that such confession has been nude by an accused person;

(iii) that it has been made to a person in authority;

(iv) that the confession has been obtained by reason of any inducement, threat or promise proceeding from a person in authority;

(v) such inducement, threat or promise, must have reference to the charge against the accused person;

(vi) the inducement, threat or promise must in the opinion of the Court be sufficient to give the accused person grounds, which would appear to him reasonable, for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him.

15. In the present case, facts (i), (iv) and (vi) have not been established. Firstly, the statement in question is not a “confession” within the contemplation of Section 24. It is now well-settled that a statement in order to amount to a “confession” must either admit in terms the offence, or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the offence. An admission of an incriminating fact, howsoever grave, is not by itself a confession. A statement which contains an exculpatory assertion of some fact, which if true, would negative the offence alleged, cannot amount to a confession (see Pakala Narayana v. Emperor MANU/PR/0001/1939 ; Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab MANU/SC/0038/1952 : 1953CriLJ154 ; Om Parkash v. State of U.P. MANU/SC/0205/1959 : AIR1960SC409 .

16. A perusal of the statement Ex. I made by the appellant before the Inspector of Customs would show that it contained exculpatory matter. Therein, the deponent claimed that he was not aware that the packages which were loaded in the truck were contraband goods, and alleged that the goods were not loaded under his instructions. The deponent claimed to be an innocent traveller in the truck when he said: “I did not ask Mullaji (driver) what goods were being loaded in his lorry…. Mullaji was only my friend and I was not aware of any of his mala fide activities.”

17. Moreover, the incriminating facts admitted in this statement, do not, even if taken cumulatively amount to admission of all the facts which constitute any offence. To bring home an offence under Section 135 of the Customs Act, in addition to the facts admitted in Ex. I, it had to be established further that these goods were dutiable or contraband goods.

18. For these reasons, it could be said beyond doubt, that the statement Ex. I was not a “confession” within the meaning of Section 24, Evidence Act.

19. Secondly, it has not been shown, that the Customs Officer - though a person in authority - had offered any inducement or held out any threat or promise to the appellant.

20. Christophen Soares, the Inspector of Customs (P.W. 4) testified that no threats, coercion or inducements were used and that the statement Exh. I was made by the appellant, voluntarily.

21. While it may be conceded that a person summoned by an Officer of Customs to make a statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act, is under compulsion of law to state the truth, the compulsion thereunder, assuming it amounts to a threat, does not proceed “from a person in authority” within the contemplation of Section 24 but emanates from law.

22. Thirdly, the mere fact that the Inspector of Customs had, before recording the statement, warned the deponent of the possibility of his prosecution for perjury in. case he did not make the statement truthfully, cannot be construed as a threat held out by the officer which could have reasonably caused the person making the statement to suppose that he would by making that statement, gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him for smuggling.

23. In view of what has been said above, we have no hesitation in holding that the statement Ex. I, was not barred under Section 24, Evidence Act. The statement Ex. P-1 was clearly admissible under Section 21, Evidence Act as an admission of incriminating facts.